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Caballes, Place, and Economic  
Rin-tin-tincentives 
THE EFFECT OF CANINE SNIFF JURISPRUDENCE 
ON THE DEMAND FOR AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
SEARCH TECHNOLOGY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The “legal fiction”1 of the canine sniff test’s infallibility 
jeopardizes the development and application of surveillance 
technologies that will allow law enforcement officers to better 
provide for public safety without running afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and 
seizures.2  In an era characterized by a continuing war on 
narcotics trafficking and overshadowed by a continuing fear of 
domestic terrorist attack, the importance of balancing privacy 
interests against realistic assessments of the intrusiveness of 
surveillance technologies is readily apparent.  Law 
enforcement initiatives designed to curb the narcotics trade 
and reduce the risk of terrorist incidents have made the drug 
 1 Illinois v. Caballes, 534 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 2 To date, only one commentator has noted that legal rules providing 
stringent protection for privacy rights create a corresponding demand on the part of 
law enforcement officers for technologies that identify only the presence or absence of 
illegal activity.  Lee C. Milstein, Fortress of Solitude or Lair of Malevolence? Rethinking 
the Desirability of Bright-Line Protection of the Home, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1789, 1816 
(2003).  While Milstein does not specifically address the effect that applying Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny to canine sniffs will visit on law-enforcement demand, another 
commentator has observed that “law enforcement agencies have too much invested in 
their dog-training programs to placidly accept” court rulings subjecting canine sniffs to 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  Max A. Hansen, United States v. Solis: Have the 
Government’s Supersniffers Come Down with a Case of Constitutional Nasal 
Congestion?, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 410, 411 (1976).  Hansen’s claim provides strong 
support for the inference that the laxity with which federal courts approached the 
canine sniff prior to and after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Caballes provided strong 
incentives for law enforcement agencies to invest in canine sniff programs.  Scholarship 
in the realms of economics and political science further supports this inference, noting 
that “a strong Fourth Amendment and strict police accountability are jointly sufficient 
for ongoing progress in search technology.”  Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, The 
Economics of the Fourth Amendment: Crime, Search, and Anti-Utopia, ECONPAPERS, 
Sept. 2004, available at http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/emowp2003/0411.htm. 
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and bomb-sniffing dog a regular feature of American life.3  
Such canines appear in our schools, at our major 
transportation hubs, at our major landmarks, and at our 
border patrol checkpoints.4  Following the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Illinois v. Caballes,5 which unequivocally insulated 
the canine sniff test from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, there is 
a strong likelihood that the police dog will become an even 
more pervasive investigative device.6  By authorizing police 
officers to use the canine as an unrestricted tool capable of 
generating the probable cause necessary to conduct full-blown 
searches of random objects and individuals,7 the Court has 
decreased the likelihood that law enforcement agencies will 
demand the development of more accurate and less intrusive 
technologies.8   
The canine sniff was the first of only two investigative 
techniques that the Supreme Court recognized as revealing 
only the presence or absence of illegal activity.9  Insisting in 
United States v. Place that it knew of “no other investigative 
procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the 
information is obtained and in the content of the information 
revealed by the procedure,” the Court classed the canine sniff 
as sui generis and resolved, albeit in dictum, that canine sniffs 
were not “searches” and were therefore not subject to Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny.10  A year later, the Court discovered 
another investigative procedure that was similarly limited, 
holding in United States v. Jacobsen11 that “a chemical test that 
merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is 
cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy” 
  
 3 See generally Tom O’Connell, Drug Sniffing Dogs Introduced into L.A. 
Schools, http://www.november.org/razorwire/rzold/09/0909.html (last visited Oct. 4, 
2006); Brian Handwerk, “Detector Dogs” Sniff Out Smugglers for U.S. Customs, 
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, July 12, 2002, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/ 
2002/07/0712_020712_drugdogs.html; Marsha Walton, Bomb-Sniffing Dogs Head to 
Airports, CNN SCI-TECH, Jan. 18, 2002, http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2002/TECH/ 
science/01/18/rec.bomb.sniffing.dogs.02/. 
 4 See supra note 3. 
 5 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.  
 6 See id. at 410 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 7 See id. at 417. 
 8 See infra note 30 and accompanying text for authority illustrating that 
police alter their search and seizure behavior (including investigatory techniques) in 
response to judicial decrees. 
 9 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
 10 Id.  
 11 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
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and is therefore not a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.12
The Court reconsidered the Fourth Amendment 
implications of the canine sniff test in Illinois v. Caballes,13 
where it decided that a defendant’s right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures had not been violated as a result of a 
canine sniff test conducted during a traffic stop for speeding.14  
The Caballes Court reiterated the Place Court’s observation 
that a canine sniff reveals only the presence or absence of 
contraband and emphasized that investigative techniques 
bearing this characteristic do not constitute “searches” under 
the Fourth Amendment.15  In a strong dissent, Justice Souter 
noted that the court’s holding was based on the untenable 
premise that canines do not err.16  After offering considerable 
empirical support for the proposition that drug sniffing canines 
are in fact fallible, Justice Souter observed that the risk of false 
positives justified treating the canine sniff as “the search that 
it amounts to in practice.”17  Because canines alert falsely, 
Justice Souter reasoned, they run the risk of revealing more 
than the mere presence or absence of illegal activity.18  As 
Justice Souter observed: 
An affirmative reaction . . . does not identify a substance the police 
already legitimately possess, but informs the police instead merely of 
a reasonable chance of finding contraband they have yet to put their 
hands on. The police will then open the container and discover 
whatever lies within, be it marijuana or the owner’s private 
papers.19
Justice Souter’s dissent thus recognized, in substance, 
that because false canine alerts present the risk of unjustified 
governmental intrusions into the citizenry’s “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects,”20 they run the risk of compromising 
legitimate interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.21  
Justice Souter therefore observed that, rather than giving law 
  
 12 Id. at 123. 
 13 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). 
 14 Id. at 408. 
 15 Id. at 409. 
 16 Id. at 410 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 17 Id. at 414. 
 18 Id. at 410-13. 
 19 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 416. 
 20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 21 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 415-17 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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enforcement agencies license to utilize the canine sniff 
indiscriminately, the Court should have required the search to 
be justified by at least a minimal level of reasonable 
suspicion.22
Building upon Justice Souter’s implication that the risk 
of false positives justifies treating the canine sniff and the 
police conduct ensuing from it as a single investigatory process 
constituting a search, this Note will explore the merits and 
market implications of requiring heightened levels of suspicion 
for the use of canines as an investigatory tool.  By challenging 
the Supreme Court’s rulings in United States v. Place, Illinois 
v. Caballes, and Kyllo v. United States,23 this Note will argue 
that a jurisprudence recognizing the fallibility of the canine 
sniff and requiring a heightened showing of suspicion on the 
part of law enforcement officers will secure privacy interests 
while incentivizing the development of surveillance 
technologies that do not intrude upon legitimate privacy 
interests.  Part II of this Note will offer essential background 
information and analysis concerning the economic and social 
incentives that the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
creates for law enforcement agencies.  Part III will examine 
and critique the development and current state of the law 
pertaining to canine sniffs in an effort to illustrate that 1) 
evidence coinciding with and post-dating Place indicates that 
canine sniffs are not infallible; 2) canine sniffs are therefore 
legible as the first step in a broader process enabling police 
officers to inspect personal property that implicates legitimate 
privacy interests; and 3) the use of drug sniffing canines as an 
investigatory tool should therefore require, at a bare minimum, 
reasonable articulable suspicion on the part of law enforcement 
officers.  Part IV will explore the implications of requiring law 
enforcement officers to have reasonable articulable suspicion 
prior to the application of a canine sniff test and suggest that 1) 
the requirement of a showing of reasonable articulable 
suspicion is too subjective to provide sufficient protection for 
privacy interests; 2) a reasonable articulable suspicion 
standard will incentivize overreaching by street level law 
enforcement officers; and 3) the requirement of such a showing 
will therefore encourage the perpetuation of status quo 
investigatory techniques.  Part V will argue that a requirement 
  
 22 Id. at 417. 
 23 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
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of probable cause prior to the application of a canine sniff will 
best protect privacy and public safety interests by illustrating 
that 1) a probable cause regime places the greatest possible 
burden upon law enforcement agencies when they rely on the 
drug sniffing canine as an investigatory tool; 2) the rigors of 
complying with probable cause’s burdensome guidelines will 
render status quo investigatory techniques unattractive to law 
enforcement officers; and 3) a requirement of probable cause 
will therefore incentivize the development and application of 
less invasive investigative techniques. 
II. OVERVIEW OF INCENTIVES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES CREATED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE  
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated.”24  Over the course of its Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has sought to strike a 
balance between the individual right to privacy and the public 
interest in enabling law enforcement officials to investigate 
crimes, make arrests, and obtain convictions.25  The desire to 
balance these interests has led to the adoption of an 
evidentiary rule of exclusion (the “exclusionary rule”), which 
provides that all evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment will be inadmissible in a court of law.26  The Court 
has traditionally recognized that the exclusionary rule serves 
to “compel respect for the [Fourth Amendment] in the only 
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to 
disregard it.”27  As interpreted by the Courts of the United 
States, the Fourth Amendment is designed to create a 
structure of legal incentives to protect individuals against 
unwarranted police intrusion.28  It follows intuitively that this 
  
 24 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 25 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 635 (1886) (noting that the 
Fourth Amendment addresses “all invasions on the part of the government and its 
employ[ee]s of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life” and that 
Constitutional protections of privacy against government intrusion “should be liberally 
construed,” because “[i]t is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights 
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon”). 
 26 The exclusionary rule was adopted at the federal level and made applicable 
to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1966).  
 27 Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 247 (1960)). 
 28 See id.; Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 229 (1969). 
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incentive structure affects law enforcement agencies’ market 
demand for technologies29—such as thermal imaging devices, x-
ray scanners, stationary radar detectors, and drug sniffing 
canines—that enhance police officers’ abilities to detect 
unlawful activity, make arrests, or issue citations.30
Faced with the possibility that such technologies may 
enable police officers to invade the “privacies of life”31 that have 
traditionally been subject to the strong protection provided by 
the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, courts examining 
the Fourth Amendment implications of such technologies have 
embarked upon two related inquiries.  Courts seek to 
determine, first, whether the use of an investigatory technology 
implicates the Fourth Amendment at all.32  In the course of this 
inquiry, courts will examine the privacy interests that the use 
of a particular technology may compromise.33  In the event that 
  
 29 This Note will use the term “technology” in its broad, etymological sense to 
mean “the practical application of knowledge especially in a particular area,” “a 
capability given by the practical application of knowledge,” or “a manner of 
accomplishing a task especially using technical processes, methods, or knowledge.”  
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/technology (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2006).  While popular usage of the term “technology” might be limited to 
inanimate objects possessing circuitry, this Note will consider thermal imaging devices, 
x-ray scanners, stationary radar detectors, and drug sniffing canines under the rubric 
of “technology” as defined above.  The Supreme Court lent legal credence to this view of 
“technology” when it recognized in United States v. Jacobsen that precedents it forged 
with respect to canine sniffs were applicable in cases involving other investigative 
techniques and technologies that revealed nothing other than the presence or absence 
of illegal activity.  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1984).  Moreover, 
numerous scholars have observed the similarities between drug sniffing canines and 
other forms of sense-enhancing technology, and have persuasively argued that legal 
precedents created in the context of canine sniffs have implications for cases pertaining 
to other search technologies.  See, e.g., Leading Cases, Fourth Amendment—Canine 
Sniff, 119 HARV. L. REV. 179, 184 (2005); David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray Vision 
and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 
29-32 (1996). 
 30 Empirical studies of the effect of the exclusionary rule on the conduct of 
police officers and the procedures of law enforcement agencies further reinforces this 
proposition.  See, Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule Failing Health? Some 
New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681, 710 (1974) 
(noting that immediately following the Court’s recognition of the exclusionary rule in 
Mapp, police officers began to seek judicial search warrants more frequently than they 
had prior to Mapp).  Canon’s statistical analysis suggests that police behavior in the 
context of search and seizure is responsive in the long term to judicial decrees 
heightening law enforcement agencies’ burden to demonstrate compliance with the 
Fourth Amendment.  Id.  See also Myron W. Orfield Jr., Note, The Exclusionary Rule 
and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1016, 1017 (1987) (noting that “[o]n an institutional level, the [exclusionary rule] has 
changed police, prosecutorial, and judicial procedures”).  
 31 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
 32 Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 33 Id. 
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the use of an investigative technology has the propensity to 
compromise legitimate privacy interests, courts will hold that 
use of the technology constitutes a “search” and that the 
Fourth Amendment therefore applies.34  Upon reaching this 
threshold conclusion, courts will then seek to determine the 
circumstances under which the Fourth Amendment will permit 
the use of an investigatory technique that compromises 
legitimate interests in privacy.35  These determinations, in 
turn, affect the extent to which law enforcement agencies will 
demand search technologies.36  If a court should conclude that 
the use of a particular investigative technology constitutes a 
“search” for Fourth Amendment purposes, police will be less 
likely to invest in it, either out of fear that its use will give rise 
to the application of the exclusionary rule or out of certainty 
that using the technology in a manner compliant with the 
Fourth Amendment would be cost-prohibitive.37  If, on the other 
hand, a court rules that the use of a particular investigative 
technology does not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, police will be more likely to invest in it because it can 
be applied without fear that courts will suppress the evidence 
that it uncovers on Fourth Amendment grounds.38
A. Incentives for Law Enforcement Agencies Under a Non-
Search Regime 
It is settled law that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places,”39 and that searches and seizures are to be 
struck down as contrary to the provisions of the Fourth 
  
 34 See id. (noting that “[t]he decision to characterize an action as a search is 
in essence a conclusion about whether the Fourth Amendment applies at all”). 
 35 See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965). 
 36 See Canon, supra note 30, at 710 (noting that Supreme Court rulings are 
effective in altering police behavior, including search and seizure conduct).  See also 
William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1265, 1267 (noting that “[w]hen the Fourth Amendment limits the use of a police 
tactic like house searches, it does two things: it raises the cost of using that tactic, and 
it lowers the relative cost of using other tactics that might be substitutes”).  
 37 See Canon, supra note 30, at 710 (noting that immediately following the 
Court’s recognition of the exclusionary rule in Mapp, police officers began to seek 
judicial search warrants more frequently than they had prior to Mapp).  Canon’s 
statistical analysis suggests that police behavior in the context of search and seizure is 
responsive in the long term to judicial decrees heightening law enforcement agencies’ 
burden to demonstrate compliance with the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  See also Orfield, 
supra note 30, at 1017 (noting that “[o]n an institutional level, the [exclusionary rule] 
has changed police, prosecutorial, and judicial procedures”). 
 38 See Stuntz, supra note 36. 
 39 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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Amendment whenever they unreasonably intrude upon an 
individual’s reasonable “expectation[s] of privacy.”40  Building 
on the rule initially articulated in Katz v. United States,41 the 
Supreme Court resolved in United States v. Jacobsen42 that 
individuals can have no reasonable expectations of privacy 
pertaining to contraband or illegal activity.43  The Jacobsen 
court concluded that no invasion of privacy had taken place 
when federal agents conducted a chemical field test to 
determine whether a white, powdery substance seeping from a 
damaged air-freight parcel was in fact cocaine.44  As the court 
observed: 
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular 
substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in 
privacy.  This conclusion is not dependent on the result of any 
particular test.  It is probably safe to assume that virtually all of the 
tests conducted under circumstances comparable to those disclosed 
by this record would result in a positive finding; in such cases, no 
legitimate interest has been compromised.  But even if the results 
are negative—merely disclosing that the substance is something 
other than cocaine—such a result reveals nothing of special interest.  
Congress has decided—and there is no question about its power to do 
so—to treat the interest in “privately” possessing cocaine as 
illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a 
substance is cocaine, and no other arguably “private” fact, 
compromises no legitimate privacy interest.45
Relying on the observation that the chemical field test at issue 
revealed only the presence or absence of criminal activity, the 
Jacobsen court drew a comparison between the chemical field 
test and the canine sniff test—an investigative technique that 
it had classed as sui generis in United States v. Place.46  The 
Place court concluded that the canine sniff was in a class unto 
itself because it revealed nothing more than the presence or 
absence of illegal activity and therefore ensured that the 
“owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment 
and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more 
intrusive investigative methods.”47  Because the Court did not 
view the canine sniff as compromising any legitimate interest 
  
 40 Id. at 361. 
 41 Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
 42 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
 43 Id. at 123. 
 44 Id. at 125. 
 45 Id. at 123. 
 46 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
 47 Id. 
2006] ECONOMIC RIN-TIN-TINCENTIVES 287 
in privacy, it concluded that canine sniffs were not searches 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.48   
The Court’s ruling in Jacobsen went a step further and 
lent credence to the view that any investigative technique 
revealing only the presence or absence of illegal activity would 
not give rise to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.49  Because such 
techniques do not constitute “searches” within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment, they do not give rise to Fourth 
Amendment inquiries pertaining to reasonableness or probable 
cause.50  Because courts have held that investigative 
techniques such as canine sniffs and chemical field tests do not 
implicate Fourth Amendment concerns, numerous 
commentators have noted that courts treat them as “non-
searches.”51  As the Fifth Circuit aptly put it, “the decision to 
characterize an action as a search is in essence a conclusion 
about whether the fourth amendment applies at all.”52  As 
such, courts have traditionally dispensed with reasonableness 
and probable cause inquiries in cases involving so-called 
“binary searches”—that is, investigative techniques revealing 
only the presence or absence of illegal activity.53
Binary search technologies are therefore attractive 
investments to law enforcement agencies.  A number of studies 
have shown that the Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings—in 
  
 48 Id. 
 49 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124. 
 50 See also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (canine sniff 
revealing only presence or absence of narcotics did not give rise to Fourth Amendment 
inquiry); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (vehicle checkpoints 
with narcotics-detection dogs did not require reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
because they revealed only the presence or absence of contraband); Place, 462 U.S. at 
707 (canine sniff held sui generis because it was deemed “less intrusive” than other 
investigative techniques and revealed only the presence or absence of illegal activity). 
 51 See Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Case Comment: Constitutional Law: Ratifying 
Suspicionless Canine Sniffs: Dog Days on the Highways, 57 FLA. L. REV. 963, 971 
(2005); Theresa A. O’Loughlin, Note: Guerrillas in the Midst: The Dangers of 
Unchecked Police Powers Through the Use of Law Enforcement Checkpoints, 6 SUFFOLK 
J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 59, 76 (2001). 
 52 Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 53 See supra note 50.  The phrase “binary search” provides a useful shorthand 
for “investigative techniques revealing merely the presence or absence of illegal 
activity.”  The phrase is scholarly in origin, and appears to have been coined by Ric 
Simmons in From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to 
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1306 (2002).  At the time of 
Simmons’ writing, the Supreme Court had decided only two “binary search” cases: 
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (involving canine sniff tests) and Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (involving 
chemical field tests purported to reveal only the presence or absence of narcotics).  The 
Court’s binary search jurisprudence has since been supplemented by Caballes and, 
arguably, Kyllo. 
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particular, the advent of the exclusionary rule in Mapp—cause 
law enforcement institutions and individual police officers to 
alter their search and seizure behavior.54  Moreover, scholars 
have noted that the exclusionary rule encourages law 
enforcement agencies that fear the deterrent remedies of 
suppression and dismissal to “find a legal way to 
obtain . . . evidence” rather than “waste their time in activities 
made unproductive by the exclusionary rule.”55  As such, binary 
search technologies present police agencies with compelling 
alternatives to more intrusive technologies.  Furthermore, 
because binary search technologies do not require law 
enforcement institutions to incur the social, institutional, and 
economic costs associated with proving that an investigatory 
activity was supported by probable cause or reasonable 
articulable suspicion, law enforcement agencies are likely to 
maximize their use of investigative techniques that do not give 
rise to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.56  As one commentator has 
noted, court-imposed search and seizure obligations operate as 
a kind of “tax” on law enforcement agencies’ search and seizure 
behavior.57  Because the rigors of complying with the Fourth 
Amendment impose considerable institutional costs on police, it 
follows that they will seek to minimize this “tax” burden by 
using investigatory techniques that do not trigger Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny.58  
B. Incentives for Law Enforcement Agencies Under 
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion and Probable Cause 
Regimes 
1. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion  
A court will “tax” investigative techniques by applying 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny when those techniques risk 
allowing police officers to detect more than the mere presence 
  
 54 See supra note 37. 
 55 Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement 
Officials, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247 n.98 (1988). 
 56 See Stuntz, supra note 36 (noting that “[w]hen the Fourth Amendment 
limits the use of a police tactic like house searches, it does two things: it raises the cost 
of using that tactic, and it lowers the relative cost of using other tactics that might be 
substitutes”). 
 57 Id. at 1275. 
 58 Id. (noting that “here as elsewhere, if you tax a given kind of behavior, you 
will probably see less of it”). 
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or absence of illegal activity.59  When applying Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny, courts will determine whether a search 
was supported by one of two possible investigatory 
prerequisites: reasonable articulable suspicion or probable 
cause.60  The Fourth Amendment requires, at a minimum, that 
officers be able to justify a search or seizure by pointing to 
specific articulable facts that generated suspicion.61  This 
investigatory prerequisite, which courts refer to as either 
“reasonable suspicion” or “reasonable articulable suspicion,” 
has been held to require police officers to show something more 
than an arbitrary justification for a search or seizure, but 
something less than full-blown probable cause.62  Because the 
quantum of evidence required under a reasonable articulable 
suspicion regime is considerably less63 than that required by 
probable cause, courts usually apply the reasonable suspicion 
standard where searches involve only minimal intrusions that 
are limited in scope to the situation that gave rise to the search 
in the first place.64  Because the nature of the intrusion is 
minimal in such cases, the “tax” that law enforcement agencies 
incur in the course of justifying the intrusion is likewise 
minimal, requiring only that police officers form impressions on 
the basis of articulable facts and be able to recount and justify 
those impressions in a court of law.65   
  
 59 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (subjecting technologies 
revealing intimate details to a requirement of probable cause). 
 60 See generally United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 61 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that a limited search in 
the context of a traffic stop may be justified when a “police officer [is] able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”).  To date, only the Ninth Circuit has held 
that the application of a sense-enhancing technology requires reasonable articulable 
suspicion, holding in United States v. Beale, 731 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1983), that canine 
sniffs required “some articulable reason” as a prerequisite to their use.  This holding 
was later overruled by an en banc rehearing.  See United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 
1289 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).  In all other cases involving sense enhancing 
technologies, courts have either  ruled that the technologies at issue were of a binary 
character, and therefore not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny or that such 
technologies were intrusive, and therefore required probable cause.  See supra notes 
50, 59 and accompanying text. 
 62 See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (noting that the standard required for 
validating searches under a reasonable articulable suspicion regime is “obviously less 
demanding than that [required] for probable cause”). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
 65 See Erica Flores, Case Comment, “People, Not Places”: The Fiction of 
Consent, the Force of the Public Interest, and the Fallacy of Objectivity in Police 
Encounters with Passengers During Traffic Stops, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1071, 1091 
(2006) (noting that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard is flawed because of 
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The Supreme Court first articulated the contours of the 
reasonable suspicion standard in Terry v. Ohio.66  In Terry, a 
police officer stopped and frisked three individuals who he 
suspected were planning a robbery.67  The officer witnessed two 
of the individuals pacing back and forth between a street 
corner and a store window.68  The third individual approached 
them and, after conferring with them briefly, left the scene.69  
After this occurred, the two individuals lingered for a while 
before walking off in the same direction as the third man.70  
The officer followed the two individuals who had lingered on 
the street corner and approached them when they caught up to 
the third individual.71  Fearing that at least one of the 
individuals was armed, the officer frisked all three of them and 
recovered firearms from two of the individuals.72  The officer 
admitted that he had no prior information regarding the three 
individuals and that his suspicion that they were “casing a job, 
a stick up” proceeded solely from what he had observed.73  The 
officer justified the frisks on the ground that he feared for his 
own safety.74  After refusing to suppress the weapons on Fourth 
Amendment grounds, the trial court convicted the two 
individuals from whom the officer recovered firearms on 
charges of carrying concealed weapons.75
Throughout all stages of Terry’s procedural history, 
courts conceded that the searches were not supported by 
probable cause, but nevertheless affirmed the trial court’s 
refusal to suppress the weapons that the officer recovered from 
the suspects.76  Hearing the case after grant of certiorari, the 
Supreme Court held that even where a search is not supported 
by probable cause, it may nevertheless be reasonable when a 
police officer’s action is “justified at its inception” and is 
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
  
“the judiciary’s almost unwavering deference to police determinations of whether it has 
been satisfied”). 
 66 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 67 Id. at 6-7. 
 68 Id. at 6. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 6-7. 
 72 Terry, 392 U.S. at 6. 
 73 Id. at 6-7. 
 74 Id. at 30. 
 75 Id. at 7-8. 
 76 Id. at 8. 
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justified the interference in the first place.”77  The Court 
observed that the officer’s actions were justified at their 
inception because he had witnessed the defendants “go through 
a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but 
which taken together warranted further investigation.”78  
Moreover, the Court noted that the search was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that gave rise to the 
intrusion because the officer’s fear that the individuals were 
contemplating a daytime robbery lent reasonable support to his 
suspicion that they were armed.79  However, the Court 
emphasized that the reasonableness of the search turned 
rather significantly on the manner in which it was conducted.80  
Because the officer only patted down the surface of the 
suspects’ clothing and did not intrude further until he felt the 
guns underneath the surface, the Court held that the search 
was “limited” and that it therefore complied with the Fourth 
Amendment even in the absence of full-blown probable cause.81   
The Terry Court thus announced that a search may be 
constitutionally permissible even in the absence of probable 
cause in cases where an officer can point to specific articulable 
facts to justify the intrusion and tailors the intrusion to both 
the scope of those facts and the inferences that he draws from 
them.82  To the extent that this reasonable articulable suspicion 
standard may be said to “tax” law enforcement agencies by 
imposing Fourth Amendment obligations, it appears to impose 
only a minimal burden.  Because the impressions that a single 
police officer forms over a brief period of time are sufficient to 
generate reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement 
agencies are not required to conduct the lengthy investigative 
processes necessary to justify searches under a probable cause 
regime.83  Moreover, because courts rely on the interpretations 
of individual police officers in the course of determining 
whether a limited search was supported by reasonable 
articulable suspicion, the sole institutional obligation that a 
  
 77 Id. at 20. 
 78 Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. 
 79 Id. at 28. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 28-30. 
 82 Id. at 20-21. 
 83 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (noting that the proof 
required to justify a search under a reasonable articulable suspicion regime is 
“considerably less” than that required under a preponderance of the evidence 
standard). 
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reasonable suspicion regime imposes upon law enforcement 
agencies is the duty of individual officers to testify as to 
specific, articulable facts that warranted the intrusion.84  
Finally, as explained at greater length below, courts typically 
defer to such testimony, which means that evidence is rarely 
suppressed in situations where a “limited” search requires only 
reasonable articulable suspicion.85  As such, while the 
institutional costs imposed by a reasonable articulable 
suspicion regime appear to be minimally higher than those 
associated with investigative techniques to which the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply, they are nevertheless far lower 
than the institutional costs associated with a requirement of 
probable cause.  It follows from these observations that an 
investigative technology would remain at least somewhat 
attractive to law enforcement agencies if a court was to rule 
that its use constituted only a minimal intrusion that must be 
supported by specific, articulable facts. 
2. Probable Cause 
Courts impose the maximum “tax” of probable cause in 
situations where police officers seek to intrude more 
significantly upon an individual’s private affairs.86  The “tax” 
imposed on law enforcement agencies and individual police 
officers is greater in such instances, because probable cause 
requires a quantum of evidence sufficient to merit the issuance 
of a warrant.87  While searches conducted under the auspices of 
probable cause are generally supported by a judicial warrant, 
even warrantless searches conducted in the field must be 
supported by probable cause when they involve more than 
“limited” intrusions into the public’s “person, houses, papers, 
  
 84 See Flores, supra note 65, at 1091 (noting that the reasonable articulable 
suspicion standard is flawed because of “the judiciary’s almost unwavering deference to 
police determinations of whether it has been satisfied”). 
 85 See id. 
 86 Both reasonable articulable suspicion and probable cause are determined 
according to reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances.  See Sokolow, 490 
U.S. at  7-8.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has endorsed the view that probable 
cause requires considerably more proof of wrongdoing than reasonable articulable 
suspicion.  See id. at 7.  As the Court held in Terry v. Ohio, reasonable suspicion may 
justify a search pursuant to a lesser quantum of evidence than that required for 
probable cause only when the nature of the intrusion is limited.  392 U.S. at 28-30.  As 
such, it follows that probable cause is required where the nature of the intrusion is 
greater.  See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. 
 87 See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965). 
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and effects.”88  Indeed, fear of incurring the judicial penalties of 
suppression or dismissal has led police officers to seek 
warrants with greater frequency in the years following the 
establishment of the exclusionary rule.89  In cases where police 
seek warrants, the cost of engaging in investigative activity 
naturally increases due to the exigencies of gathering evidence, 
presenting it to a magistrate, filing a sworn affidavit affirming 
the existence of probable cause, and persuading the magistrate 
that probable cause exists.90   
Even in cases where police conduct searches without 
judicially granted warrants, a court will conduct a de novo 
review of the facts to determine whether the quantum of 
evidence available to the officer was sufficient to merit the 
issuance of a warrant on the ground of probable cause.91  In 
order for suspicion to rise to a level sufficient to merit a judicial 
warrant, a court must find that the information justifying the 
warrant request is sufficiently trustworthy to be considered 
and that the amount of evidence offered is sufficient to 
constitute probable cause.92  A court will require a greater 
showing as to the “trustworthiness” of evidence under a 
probable cause regime than it will under a reasonable 
articulable suspicion regime,93 and the quantum of evidence 
that is required for a search to be supported by probable cause 
is likewise much greater.94  As such, a probable cause regime 
“taxes” law enforcement agencies more than a reasonable 
articulable suspicion regime, requiring them to produce a 
quantum of evidence far exceeding the subjective impressions 
required by reasonable suspicion.95  Because producing such 
  
 88 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 89 See Orfield, supra note 30, at 1017-18. 
 90 See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity of, and Admissibility of 
Evidence Discovered in, Search Authorized by Judge over Telephone, 38 A.L.R. 4th 1145 
(2004) (outlining the standard procedure for the issuance of a warrant). 
 91 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 690 (1996) (holding that 
appellate courts should conduct de novo review of warrantless searches to determine 
whether probable cause actually existed). 
 92 See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112-14 (1964) (affirming that the 
trustworthiness of information must be evaluated according to its basis and veracity), 
overruled on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 93 See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695 (treating probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion as similarly fluid inquiries involving inquiry into the totality of the 
circumstances). 
 94 See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (noting that the quantum of evidence required 
under a reasonable articulable suspicion regime is less than that required by probable 
cause). 
 95 Id. 
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evidence imposes pervasive procedural and institutional costs 
on law enforcement agencies, it follows that police officers are 
least likely to prefer investigative techniques that require a 
showing of probable cause to justify their use.96
In cases involving investigatory technologies, courts are 
particularly likely to require probable cause when law 
enforcement agencies employ technologies not in public use.97  
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court considered the use of 
thermal imaging devices to detect the growth of marijuana 
inside homes.98  The technology at issue in Kyllo enabled police 
officers to determine whether the levels of heat emanating from 
a home were consistent with the use of high intensity lamps 
typically used in the process of indoor marijuana growth.99  The 
thermal imaging device used by the police officers converted 
radiation into images on the basis of relative warmth, 
producing only a “crude visual image” of infrared radiation 
emanating from the home.100  The Kyllo court held that the use 
of the thermal imaging device was subject to Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny because the device was not in public use 
and enabled law enforcement officers to obtain “information 
regarding the interior of the home” that could not otherwise 
have been obtained without physical intrusion.101  Although the 
Court offered sparse justification for hinging the probable 
cause requirement on whether or not a technology is in general 
public use, the requirement is in all likelihood based on the 
notion that an individual cannot have reasonable expectations 
of privacy pertaining to activities that a member of the general 
public could become privy to by use of widely available 
technology.102  As such, the Court ultimately concluded that the 
use of thermal imaging devices to obtain information regarding 
the interior of the home was presumptively unreasonable 
  
 96 See Stuntz, supra note 36, at 1284. 
 97 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).  Read side by side with 
the Court’s holdings in Caballes and Place, the Kyllo Court’s conclusion that the use of 
search technologies not in general public use must be supported by probable cause begs 
the obvious question of whether the drug sniffing canine may be deemed to be “in 
general public use.”  See id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 29. 
 100 Id. at 30. 
 101 Id. at 34. 
 102 Id. (presumably referring to reasonable expectations of privacy when 
justifying the “general public use” requirement by stating that the rule “assures 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted”). 
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unless conducted under the auspices of probable cause, 
pursuant to a judicially granted warrant.103
The Kyllo rule is likely to place a strong burden on law 
enforcement agencies seeking to use surveillance technologies 
that courts deem to compromise legitimate privacy interests.  
Although the Kyllo decision turned rather significantly on the 
fact that a new technology was used to glean information 
regarding the home, dictum concerning the thermal imaging 
device’s ability to reveal purely innocent behavior—such as the 
time of day that the “lady of the house takes her daily sauna”—
at least suggests that the decision turned, in part, on the 
ability of the emergent surveillance technology to disclose more 
than the presence or absence of illegal activity.104  When 
analyzed in conjunction with the holdings of Place, Caballes, 
and Jacobsen, this dictum lends credence to the view that 
surveillance technologies will trigger at least a minimal level of 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny whenever they reveal more than 
the presence or absence of illegal activity.  Although the Court 
has yet to examine devices such as the thermal imager outside 
the context of home surveillance, Kyllo’s observation that 
thermal imaging devices reveal “intimate” details suggests that 
such devices would implicate Fourth Amendment concerns 
regardless of the context in which they are used.105
Since the Court held that the application of technologies 
not in general public use requires probable cause in the context 
of home surveillance, it created a disincentive for law 
enforcement agencies to invest in emerging search technologies 
that might be used to scrutinize the home.106  Since such 
technologies, by virtue of the mere fact that they are “new,” 
generally tend not to be in public use, it follows that the Kyllo 
rule provides a strong incentive for law enforcement agencies 
to maintain status quo investigatory techniques.  As a result of 
Kyllo, it appears likely that law enforcement agencies will 
continue to invest in canine detection107 and forgo investment 
  
 103 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 104 Id. at 38. 
 105 Id. 
 106 See Stuntz, supra note 36. 
 107 See Max A. Hansen, United States v. Solis: Have the Government’s 
Supersniffers Come Down with a Case of Constitutional Nasal Congestion?, 13 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 410, 411 (1976) (observing that “[l]aw enforcement agencies have too 
much invested in their dog training programs to placidly accept” court rulings 
subjecting canine sniffs to Fourth Amendment scrutiny). 
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in emerging technologies regardless of whether those 
technologies are more accurate and less invasive.108
III. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF CANINE SNIFFS UNDER THE 
CURRENT NON-SEARCH REGIME 
As noted above, investigative techniques that do not 
interfere with an individual’s reasonable expectations of 
privacy are considered “non-searches” for the purpose of Fourth 
Amendment inquiry and do not require courts to apply either 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause standards.109  Because 
so-called binary searches are thought to reveal only the 
presence or absence of illegal activity, these investigative 
techniques fall outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment.110  
Of the two investigative technologies that the Court has 
exempted from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, the canine sniff 
test was reconsidered most recently in Illinois v. Caballes.111  In 
Caballes, the Court reiterated its decades-old position that 
canine sniff tests are not subject to the Fourth Amendment 
because they are limited intrusions that reveal only the 
presence or absence of contraband.112  Caballes involved a drug 
conviction resulting from a canine sniff conducted during a 
routine traffic stop.113  An Illinois state trooper stopped Roy I. 
Caballes for speeding on the highway and radioed his police 
dispatcher to report the stop.114  Overhearing this transmission, 
a second trooper drove to the location of the stop with a drug-
detecting canine.115  While the first trooper was writing out a 
citation for Caballes’ speeding, the second trooper walked his 
dog around the car.116  The dog alerted to Caballes’ trunk, and a 
subsequent search revealed marijuana.117   
In a brief opinion that insulated the canine sniff test 
from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, the Caballes majority was 
careful to cite United States v. Jacobsen, where the Court 
observed that chemical field tests for the presence of narcotics 
  
 108 See supra note 36. 
 109 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 110 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
 111 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
 112 Id. at 408. 
 113 Id. at 406. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 406. 
 117 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. 
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were not searches because, like the canine sniff test, they 
reveal only the presence or absence of illegal activity.118  The 
fact that the Supreme Court grouped the canine sniff and the 
chemical field test together under the “binary search” rubric 
illustrates not only the fictitious quality of the Court’s canine 
sniff jurisprudence, but also the specious reasoning underlying 
the formation of the category itself.119  The reliability of the 
chemical field test has been called into question.120  Likewise, 
federal case law and private research have shown that canine 
sniffs are not as reliable as the Court would like to believe.121  
While the inherent unreliability of both investigative 
procedures raises the specter of unwarranted intrusions upon 
innocent individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy, the 
fact that chemical field tests are invariably performed upon 
substances lawfully within police custody establishes that the 
intrusion of the chemical field test does not rise to the same 
level of invasiveness as the intrusion enabled by a false canine 
alert.122  Unlike the chemical field test, which is immune from 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny when performed upon substances 
lying in plain view, the canine sniff test is applied for the 
purpose of locating concealed substances.123  Moreover, 
chemical field tests arguably do not involve the same level of 
intrusion and intimidation that may arise in the context of a 
canine-wielding police officer approaching an individual or that 
individual’s property.124
Despite the obvious disparities between canine sniffs 
and chemical field tests, the Caballes Court nevertheless 
observed that both investigative techniques are not searches 
because they reveal only the presence or absence of 
contraband.125  In so holding, the Court at long last gave 
precedential force to decades-old dictum from United States v. 
Place, in which the Court observed that canine sniffs “[do] not 
  
 118 Id. at 408. 
 119 Id.; United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984). 
 120 See Blanchard & Chin, Identifying the Enemy in the War on Drugs, 47 AM. 
U. L. REV. 557, 583 n.160 (1998) (noting that “typically, field tests used by officers are 
merely indicative and not conclusive of the presence of a narcotic substance”).
 121 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing K. Garner et 
al., Duty Cycle of the Detector Dog: A Baseline Study (Apr. 2001) (prepared under 
Federal Aviation Administration grant by the Institute for Biological Detection 
Systems of Auburn University)). 
 122 See id. at 415. 
 123 Id. at 416. 
 124 Id. at 417-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 125 Id. at 409-10. 
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constitute [searches] within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment” because the limited disclosures afforded by dog 
sniffs “ensure[] that the owner of . . . property is not subjected 
to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less 
discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods.”126  The 
Place Court offered no empirical justification for its dictum that 
canine sniffs reveal only the presence or absence of contraband, 
and the fact that the observation was inessential to the Court’s 
holding is underscored by the Court’s failure to ask the parties 
to brief the issue.127  Nevertheless, the Caballes Court seized 
upon the Place Court’s dictum in concluding that because 
canine sniffs are not searches, they do not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment and, therefore, do not require a showing of 
probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion prior to 
their application.128  
The dubious validity of the Place Court’s dictum 
notwithstanding, the Caballes Court used this analysis to 
distinguish its ruling from Kyllo v. United States,129 where a 
divided Court held that the warrantless use of a thermal 
imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home 
was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment because the 
device was not in public use and had the potential to reveal 
more information than the presence or absence of criminal 
activity.130  The Caballes Court’s insistence that a canine sniff 
“only reveals the presence of contraband” and therefore 
“compromises no legitimate privacy interest” is specious, 
however, insofar as it fails to adequately address petitioner’s 
argument that “error rates, particularly the existence of false 
positives, call into question the premise that drug-detection 
dogs alert only to contraband.”131  Noting that “the record 
contains no evidence or findings that support [petitioner’s] 
argument,” the Court went on to suggest that since “an 
erroneous alert, in and of itself, reveals . . . [no] legitimate 
private information” it may be found “sufficiently reliable to 
establish probable cause to conduct a full-blown search.”132   
  
 126 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
 127 See H. Paul Honsinger, Katz and Dogs: Canine Sniff Inspections and the 
Fourth Amendment, 44 LA. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (1984). 
 128 Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
 129 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 130 Id. at 40. 
 131 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 405. 
 132 Id. at 409. 
2006] ECONOMIC RIN-TIN-TINCENTIVES 299 
In so holding, the Court failed to acknowledge the 
reality, observed by Justice Souter in his dissent, that a “dog 
who alerts hundreds of times will be wrong dozens of times.”133  
Justice Souter’s observation narrows the alleged gulf between 
Kyllo and Caballes, suggesting that a canine sniff test may 
amount, in some cases, to the functional equivalent of other 
investigatory techniques that are subject to Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny due to the fact that they disclose more 
than the presence or absence of contraband.  While it is true 
that an erroneous canine sniff “in and of itself”134 discloses no 
concrete facts about the contents of the object or individual 
being subjected to the investigation, such a procedure, when 
combined with the ensuing police inspection that it authorizes, 
carries with it the same potential for embarrassment and 
invasion at stake in the case of a thermal imaging device.135  In 
fact, the possibility of false positives may implicate stronger 
privacy interests than those compromised by a thermal 
imaging device.136  Whereas the thermal imaging device at 
issue in Kyllo was capable only of exposing “a crude image” of 
heat emanating from a home and did not enable police officers 
to discern persons or objects inside the domicile, a false canine 
alert enables a police officer to conduct a full-blown physical 
search of the contents of a container.137  As such, Justice Souter 
was correct to observe that “it makes sense . . . to treat a sniff 
as the search that it amounts to in practice, and to rely on the 
body of our Fourth Amendment cases, including Kyllo, in 
deciding whether such a search is reasonable.”138   
  
 133 Id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 134 Id. at 409 (majority opinion). 
 135 Id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 136 This claim assumes that “intimate details” disclosed as the outcome of a 
search carry with them stronger privacy interests than so-called “insignificant” details.  
While the Kyllo decision hinged, in part, on the proposition that all details disclosed 
during surveillance of the home are “intimate,” nothing in the Caballes decision 
indicates that a dog sniff would be an impermissible search if performed outside the 
door of a home or apartment.  As such, it may be the case that the rulings of Kyllo and 
Caballes are on a collision course with one another. 
 137 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 138 Id. at 413.  The failure to harmonize Kyllo is not the sole problem with the 
Caballes Court’s reasoning.  As Justice Ginsburg persuasively observed in her own 
Caballes dissent, the canine sniff at issue was also contrary to the Court’s ruling in 
Terry v. Ohio, where it held that the investigative techniques employed by police 
officers must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.”  See id. at 418 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).  While the Court’s failure to consider Terry may be 
indicative of a broad desire to uphold canine sniffs in all circumstances, for the 
purposes of this Note it is sufficient to observe that error rates provide sufficient 
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The history of federal canine sniff jurisprudence is 
replete with evidence of the method’s unreliability.139  While 
the lion’s share of cases casting doubt on the technique’s 
infallibility predate the Supreme Court’s controlling rulings in 
Place and Caballes, their unique facts nevertheless indicate 
that dogs are far from one hundred percent accurate.  In 
United States v. Sullivan,140 the Fourth Circuit concluded that 
a canine sniff was not a search despite the fact that law 
enforcement officers relied on less than a “full alert” to 
generate the probable cause necessary to conduct a full-blown 
search of the defendant’s luggage.141  As the Court put it, the 
dog did not “give signs of sensing drugs by pawing at the 
luggage excitedly, but he did show an interest in one blue 
bag.”142  The Court’s anthropomorphic treatment of the canine 
may strike some as humorous, but the very notion that a well-
trained canine engaged in a police investigation can show less 
than “full alert” also casts significant doubt on the binary 
character of the sniff test.  The facts in Sullivan illustrate that, 
rather than alerting to the presence of contraband, canines 
may also indicate the mere possibility of such a presence.143  
While it is true that the investigation in Sullivan resulted in a 
seizure of narcotics, this seizure was the outcome of a less than 
reliable application of the dog sniff technique.144  Although the 
Sullivan ruling predates Caballes, nothing in the controlling 
case indicated that the course of action undertaken by police 
officers in Sullivan ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment.  
Because the Caballes majority failed to analyze the sniff test as 
a single investigatory process comprised of the activities of a 
canine and his police handlers, it provided no mechanism for 
distinguishing between an alert and a mere indication of 
interest.145   In essence, the Caballes rule permits dogs to sniff 
  
ground to hold that canine sniffs are searches under the rule articulated in Katz and 
extended in Kyllo. 
 139 See generally Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. 
Ind. 1979). 
 140 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 141 Id. at 12-13. 
 142 Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
 143 This possibility also arose in United States v. Guzman, 75 F.3d 1090, 1091-
92 (6th Cir. 1996), where a handler also distinguished between a dog’s “interest” and 
full alert. 
 144 See id. at 1096 (acknowledging prior to Caballes that a dog’s “interest” in a 
bag alone would not constitute probable cause). 
 145 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 416 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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persons and objects indiscriminately146 and allows law 
enforcement officers to interpret a dog’s behavior in whatever 
manner they wish.147  This concern is all the more prevalent 
insofar as the conclusiveness of canine sniffs is so often 
predicated on the subjective impressions of dog handlers.148  As 
one commentator has noted, “[c]anines often have their own 
particular pattern for communicating an alert.  If a handler is 
not aware of a dog’s particular behavior, she may mistake an 
indication of narcotics for a reaction to food, another animal, or 
other distraction.”149
To the extent that Caballes can be read as authorizing 
the investigative process at issue in Sullivan, it is clear that 
current law permits a less than full canine alert to justify a 
full-blown search, particularly when a canine’s “interest” is 
accompanied by individualized suspicion.150  This observation 
once again suggests a closer parallel between canine sniffs and 
the surveillance technology at issue in Kyllo than the Caballes 
majority was willing to admit.  As one commentator has noted, 
a canine “interest” in an object or person may proceed from 
nothing other than innocent factors such as the scent of food, 
perfume, or another animal.151  Similarly, in Kyllo, the thermal 
imaging device at issue had the ability to detect heat 
signatures that might have been owing to any number of 
innocent factors.152  As such, Sullivan’s fact pattern supports 
the revision of the Caballes rule to reflect the fact that canines 
may alert to the possibility rather than the certainty of the 
presence of contraband. 
  
 146 See id. at 422-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 147 See Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the 
Narcotics Detecting Dog, 85 KY. L. J. 405, 424-35 (1997) (noting that false positives 
typically result from subjective error on the part of canine handlers).  The analysis 
above presumes that misinterpretations may also be willful. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 423 (citation omitted). 
 150 See United States v. Guzman, 75 F.3d 1090, 1091-92 (6th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993).  It is worth noting that 
neither of these cases requires individualized suspicion as a precondition for the 
application of a canine sniff.  They merely note that a canine “interest” in a person or 
receptacle is only sufficient to generate probable cause when accompanied by 
independent observations tending to arouse articulable suspicion. Guzman, 75 F.3d at 
1096; Jacobs, 986 F.2d at 1235.  
 151 Bird, supra note 147, at 423. 
 152 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001) (observing that heat 
signatures might be generated by “the lady of the house tak[ing] her daily sauna and 
bath”). 
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Where Sullivan suggests that canine behavior may be 
less than certain in a given investigatory situation, the 
notorious case of Doe v. Renfrow153 illustrates that canines are 
downright incorrect in many cases.154  In Doe, a dog alerted 
when it sniffed a thirteen-year-old girl during the course of a 
warrantless dragnet inspection at an Indiana junior high 
school.155  When a superficial search of the student’s person 
failed to uncover contraband, she was subjected to an equally 
fruitless strip search.156  It was later discovered that the 
student had been playing with her own dog, which was in heat, 
on the morning of the search.157  The false alerts at issue in Doe 
were not limited to this one individual.  Although police dogs 
alerted to more than fifty students during the course of the 
dragnet inspection,158 contraband was recovered from only 
seventeen students.159  As such, Doe strongly subverts the 
judicial myth that canine sniffs are one hundred percent 
accurate and supports a more realistic classification of the 
canine sniff as a search subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  
While it is perhaps the case that the mere application of canine 
sniffs did not impinge upon the students’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy, the Court did not hesitate to conclude 
that the subsequent strip search prompted by a false alert 
deprived the student of her Fourth Amendment rights.  As the 
above analysis has shown, there is no rational basis for 
distinguishing between the sniff and the conduct of a police 
officer, because handlers may erroneously interpret canine 
behavior as an alert.160  As such, it makes sense to treat the 
canine sniff as the first step in an investigatory procedure 
implicating the Fourth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court’s broad ruling in Place that canine 
sniffs reveal only the presence or absence of criminal activity 
placed the Court’s canine sniff jurisprudence on a collision 
course with the factual scenario that the Eleventh Circuit 
considered in Merrett v. Moore.161  In Merrett, the Eleventh 
Circuit ruled on the constitutionality of a dragnet procedure in 
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 154 Id. at 1017. 
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which police officers conducted a series of canine sniff tests on 
automobiles stopped at a highway roadblock.162  Although the 
procedure generated twenty-eight canine alerts, only one 
person was arrested for possession of narcotics.163  Despite 
recounting evidence of false positives in its own recitation of 
the facts, the Court nevertheless relied on Place in holding that 
canine sniffs are not searches under the Fourth Amendment.164  
As if aware of the inherent inconsistency between the facts 
before it and the Supreme Court’s classification of the canine 
sniff as a binary search, the Court declined to quote the Place 
rationale that canine sniffs disclose only the presence or 
absence of illegal activity.165  Considered in this light, Merrett 
provides what is perhaps the best rationale for revising the 
rule articulated in Caballes and Place.  By forging a rule based 
on the proposition that canines do not err, the Supreme Court 
has doomed district and circuit courts considering cases 
involving false positives to contradict themselves in the sheer 
act of adhering to controlling authority.  As such, the interest 
of judicial consistency mandates that the rule be altered to 
require either reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
The circuit courts’ rulings in each of the cases discussed 
above are consistent with the rule articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Caballes.  Before Caballes, only a minority of circuit 
courts were willing to subject canine sniffs to Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny, and then only in special cases.166  These 
limitations on the canine sniff have been swept away in favor of 
an authoritative ruling that enables law enforcement officers to 
conduct canine sniffs at random without need for probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion.167  In an era when law 
enforcement agencies increasingly seek to maximize the use of 
surveillance technologies in the service of public safety, it is a 
matter of common sense that legal rules insulating police 
canine usage from Fourth Amendment scrutiny will incentivize 
continued police reliance on the canine as an investigatory tool.  
It follows from this observation that the use of canines will 
increase, perhaps even to the point of constituting random, 
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 163 Id. at 1549. 
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 166 See generally United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982); United 
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dragnet-type searching.168  Ironically, the incentive for police 
officers to increase their usage of canine detection may 
ultimately decrease the net effectiveness of canine sniffs due to 
the fact that “dog sniffs are most effective when implemented 
in tandem with law enforcement expertise and least effective 
when conducting random searches.”169   
This final observation suggests that the incentives 
created for law enforcement officers under a non-search regime 
endanger not only individual rights to privacy, but also public 
safety.  Because canines err, a false alert may enable law 
enforcement officers to intrude upon the “privacies of life”170 
that should be protected by the Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule.171  Moreover, the “legal fiction” that canine 
sniffs are one hundred percent accurate authorizes police 
officers to use canines indiscriminately and thereby reduces the 
net effectiveness of the canine as an investigatory tool.172  
Finally, because the Court’s ruling in Kyllo would subject 
possible alternatives to the canine sniff test to a higher Fourth 
Amendment burden by requiring a showing of probable 
cause,173 it follows that law enforcement agencies have little 
incentive to seek more accurate and less intrusive investigatory 
technologies.  The current non-search regime thus creates a 
situation in which police officers would rather maintain the 
status quo than embrace technologies that require showings of 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF CANINE SNIFFS UNDER A 
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION REGIME 
The insufficiencies of the Supreme Court’s empirical 
assumptions highlighted in the above analysis of Caballes and 
Place suggest that the canine sniff’s unreliability requires some 
level of Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  Numerous scholars have 
suggested that the low-level intrusiveness of canine sniffs 
merits the requirement of a level of suspicion rising above 
arbitrariness but falling short of full-blown probable cause.174  
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While the assumption that canine sniffs are relatively 
unintrusive when compared with other investigative 
techniques will be subject to interrogation in the portion of this 
Note dealing with the implications of a probable cause regime, 
the analysis that follows will examine the policy implications of 
requiring only a showing of reasonable articulable suspicion 
rather than the full-blown probable cause required by more 
intrusive investigative methods.  Viewing reasonable 
articulable suspicion from the standpoint of economic incentive, 
this analysis will show not only that the deference with which 
courts have treated the reasonable articulable suspicion test is 
likely to result in the perpetuation of status quo investigatory 
techniques, but also that deference to the judgment of police 
officers under a reasonable suspicion regime will result in a 
standard that differs from arbitrariness in name alone.   
The Supreme Court has held that reasonable articulable 
suspicion “is a less demanding standard than probable cause 
not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be 
established with information that is different in quantity or 
content than that required to establish probable cause, but also 
in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from 
information that is less reliable than that required to show 
probable cause.”175  In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held 
that a “limited” search can be justified on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion when a “police officer [is] able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion.”176  In order to determine whether a search is 
reasonable, courts should balance the “nature and extent of the 
governmental interests involved” against the searched 
individual’s expectations of freedom from interference by law 
enforcement officers.177  When considering the quantum of 
evidence necessary to generate reasonable suspicion, the 
Supreme Court has never provided a hard and fast rule, 
holding instead that the standard is “obviously less demanding 
than that required for probable cause”178 and requires 
“considerably less”179 proof of wrongdoing than a preponderance 
of the evidence standard would necessitate.  The nebulosity of 
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 177 Id. at 22. 
 178 United Sates v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
 179 Id. 
306 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
these principles has resulted in a standard that is so 
deferential to the judgment of police officers that practically 
any articulated justification is sufficient to withstand Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny.180
To determine whether a search or seizure is supported 
by “reasonable suspicion,” a court will evaluate the totality of 
the circumstances of each case to ascertain whether a law 
enforcement officer had a “particularized and objective basis” 
for suspecting that criminal activity was afoot.181  While 
nominally “objective,” the reasonable suspicion test 
nevertheless permits police officers to rely on “their own 
experience and specialized training to make inferences from 
and deductions about the cumulative information available to 
them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’”182  The 
standard for evaluating the propriety of investigatory conduct 
supported by reasonable suspicion is therefore not that of a 
reasonable individual, but rather an individual “versed in the 
field of law enforcement.”183  While the Supreme Court has gone 
to great lengths to characterize the reasonable articulable 
suspicion test as objective,184 the emphasis that the Court has 
placed upon police officers’ particularized experience and 
training nevertheless reveals that the test is applied with 
deference to the subjective judgments of individual law 
enforcement officers.185
As one commentator has noted, the deference with 
which courts approach the reasonable suspicion test is in fact 
so expansive as to swallow up the requirement that a police 
officer be able to point to particularized facts to justify an 
intrusion.186  Because the Supreme Court has explicitly 
authorized courts to determine the reasonableness of an 
investigatory procedure with reference to the experience and 
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training of a particular officer, the Court has introduced a large 
element of subjectivity into a test that it alleges to be 
“objective.”187  Even if the Court’s rulings fall short of endorsing 
searches made pursuant to full-blown, individualized 
subjectivity, the standard nevertheless embraces the subjective 
wiles of law enforcement as an institution by constraining its 
analysis to reasonable inferences drawn by an individual 
“versed in the field of law enforcement.”188  In light of law 
enforcement institutions’ profoundly self-interested concern 
with making arrests and obtaining convictions, Erica Flores 
had noted that such a rule is tantamount to “trusting the pope 
to uphold the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.”189
The legal mechanics of applying a reasonable suspicion 
regime to canine sniff tests are inferable from Federal case law 
predating Place.  While circuit court cases decided before Place 
almost uniformly concluded that canine sniffs, whether 
conducted in schools, at airports, or during traffic stops, did not 
constitute searches for the purposes of Fourth Amendment 
inquiry, the lion’s share of these decisions nevertheless 
addressed the question of “cause” in dictum.190  Even where the 
circuit courts did not address the question of cause overtly, 
many nevertheless recounted narratives of events that 
generated police suspicion.   
In United States v. Fulero, the court held that a canine 
sniff was not an unreasonable search when a police dog alerted 
at footlockers owned by “three hippies,” one of whom the 
arresting officer recognized as “probably involved in the 
narcotics traffic.”191  Although the court dismissed the 
petitioner’s assertion that the canine sniff was a search as 
“frivolous,” the Court’s decision to recount the factors that gave 
rise to the officer’s suspicion prior to the application of the sniff 
tacitly implicated the Fourth Amendment.192  Likewise, in 
United States v. Bronstein, the Second Circuit held that a 
canine sniff was not a search, but nevertheless observed that 
tips received from airline personnel had provided law 
enforcement officers with “ample cause” to investigate the 
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petitioners.193  Finally, in United States v. Klein, the Seventh 
Circuit held that canine sniffs were not searches, but noted 
that “authorities already had reasonable suspicion to believe 
that the luggage contained contraband and used a dog as a 
further investigatory device.”194  In reaching this decision, the 
Court declined to decide whether the use of canine sniffs would 
be constitutional in sweeping, “dragnet-type sniffing 
expedition[s].”195  The Klein court’s final observation is in clear 
tension with its ruling that canine sniffs do not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment insofar as “the scope of an activity is [only] 
relevant . . . as to its reasonableness once it has been 
characterized as a search.”196   
One commentator has noted, more generally, that the 
tendency of the Fulero, Bronstein, and Klein courts to recount 
narratives of “cause” leading up to the application of canine 
sniffs is in tension with their underlying conclusion that canine 
sniffs, when considered alone, are not subject to Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny.197  Writing shortly after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Place, Professor Honsinger observed that “if 
a sniff is not a search, it should be subject to no restrictions as 
to reasonableness, and there is no valid constitutional basis for 
subjecting it to a suspicion requirement.”198  Endorsing the 
Ninth Circuit’s view of the issue in United States v. Beale,199 
Honsinger went on to suggest that a canine sniff should be 
considered a “subsearch” requiring a showing of at least some 
level of suspicion rising above arbitrariness but falling short of 
probable cause.200
The Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the canine sniff issue 
provides a compelling lens through which to view the 
implications of a reasonable articulable suspicion regime.  In 
Beale I, a police officer observed two male Caucasians exit a 
taxi cab in front of an airport.201  After checking three pieces of 
luggage, one of which bore an identification tag indicating a 
New Jersey address, the two individuals parted company and 
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obtained their airplane seating assignments from the ticket 
counter.202  The men shared the same flight itinerary, having 
purchased first class tickets to San Diego with a stopover in 
Houston.203  After leaving the ticket counter separately, the two 
men rejoined when they entered the boarding area.204  
Observing that their behavior was consistent with a general 
drug courier profile, the officer approached the two gentlemen 
and identified himself.205  The officer asked the men for 
identification and whether they had ever been arrested.206  One 
of the men, who appeared nervous, answered that he had been 
arrested on a narcotics charge six years ago.207  The officer 
subsequently ordered that the bags that the two men checked 
be subjected to a canine sniff test.208  Upon sniffing the men’s 
bags, the dog alerted, and the officer found narcotics.209
The Court expressed no opinion as to whether these 
facts were sufficient to generate reasonable articulable 
suspicion, but nevertheless observed that the trial court had 
erred in failing to conduct a Fourth Amendment inquiry.210  
Because the Ninth Circuit found that a canine sniff test was “a 
Fourth Amendment intrusion, albeit a limited one,” it vacated 
the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.211  The Supreme Court subsequently vacated and 
remanded the Ninth Circuit’s holding for reconsideration in 
light of the Supreme Court’s classification of canine sniffs as 
sui generis in United States v. Place.212  Rehearing the case, the 
Beale II213 Court resolved somewhat defiantly that a 
requirement of reasonable articulable suspicion was consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Place.214  Although this 
holding was subsequently reversed following an en banc 
rehearing,215 the Beale II court nevertheless observed that the 
  
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 1328 n.1. 
 206 Id. at 1328-29. 
 207 Beale I, 674 F.2d at 1329. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. at 1335-36. 
 211 Id. 
 212 United States v. Beale, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983). 
 213 United States v. Beale (Beale II), 731 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1983), rehearing 
granted, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 214 Id. at 593-94. 
 215 United States v. Beale (Beale III), 736 F.2d 1289 (1984).  
310 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
history of federal canine sniff jurisprudence in sister circuits 
tacitly suggested that canine sniffs should be subjected to a 
reasonable articulable suspicion standard: 
Despite the general proffer of arguments tending to exclude canine 
investigations from Fourth Amendment control, no federal court has 
yet upheld a canine investigation in the face of a record 
demonstrating a lack of prior individualized suspicion.  Several 
courts have expressly noted the existence of prior suspicion in 
affirming the validity of the sniff, and some have stressed that the 
court was not confronted with an indiscriminate “dragnet” type of 
investigation.216
In the course of reaching this conclusion, the Beale II 
Court cited the aforementioned cases of Klein and Bronstein, 
suggesting that a reasonable articulable suspicion regime 
would validate canine sniffs conducted under conditions 
resembling the facts of those cases.  Moreover, although the 
Beale II Court failed to cite United States v. Fulero, its 
recognition that “no federal court has yet upheld a canine 
investigation in the face of a record demonstrating a lack of 
prior individualized suspicion” tacitly suggests the Court’s 
approval of the result in Fulero.217
Viewed through the lens of the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
in Beale II, the impact of a reasonable articulable suspicion 
regime on the surveillance technology market becomes clear.  
Such a regime would authorize canine sniff tests under 
circumstances falling far short of the requirements of probable 
cause.  As in Fulero, such a regime would permit canine sniffs 
in instances where police suspicion is predicated on little more 
than amorphous social impressions (such as one or more 
suspects being a “hippy”) and uncorroborated personal 
recollections (such as one or more suspects being recognized as 
“involved in the drug trade”).  The Ninth Circuit’s observation 
thus gives rise to the conclusion that imposing a reasonable 
articulable suspicion regime for canine sniffs would result in 
nothing more than a perpetuation of the post-Place status quo.  
The history of “reasonable suspicion” as a prerequisite for 
investigatory procedures is rife with evidence of the potential 
for police overreaching.  Outside of the canine sniff context, the 
reasonableness regime has permitted police to expand the 
scope of investigations for reasons amounting to little more 
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than the fact that an individual appeared “nervous and 
fidgety.”218 Because of the considerable deference accorded to 
police officers in the adjudication of whether or not a search 
was conducted pursuant to reasonable articulable suspicion, it 
appears that such a regime would provide law enforcement 
agencies with little incentive to invest in more accurate and 
less intrusive alternatives to the canine sniff test. 
V. ANALYSIS OF CANINE SNIFFS UNDER A PROBABLE CAUSE 
REGIME 
The preceding analysis illustrates that imposing a 
reasonable suspicion regime on the canine sniff test would give 
police officers incentives to maintain status quo procedures.  
Absent some meaningful reconfiguration of the reasonable 
articulable suspicion standard,219 self-interest will lead law 
enforcement officers to proffer minimal justifications for 
disproportionately invasive searches and seizures.220  Judicial 
deference to police justifications will in turn create a situation 
in which law enforcement agencies do not experience the costs 
of the exclusionary rule.221  As such, it appears unlikely that a 
reasonable suspicion regime would lead law enforcement 
officers to divert resources to less intrusive and more effective 
technologies.222  Imposing a probable cause regime may 
therefore be the best way to maximize market incentives for 
the development of investigatory alternatives that more closely 
resemble binary technologies.  The remainder of this Note will 
set forth the legal principles by which a court might subject the 
canine sniff test to probable cause requirements and examine 
the effects of such a regime upon the surveillance technology 
market.  
As noted above, the Place court based its classification 
of canine sniffs as “non-searches,” in part, on the observation 
that canine sniffs are non-intrusive.223  As Justice Ginsburg 
noted in her Caballes dissent, however, the imposition of a 
drug sniffing canine onto an individual’s person or property can 
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be quite intimidating.224  As a dissenting Tenth Circuit judge 
noted in United States v. Williams, “These drug dogs are not 
lap dogs.”225 Coupled with the fact that canines and their 
handlers are error prone,226 the Justices’ observations suggest 
that the nature of the canine sniff intrusion merits some 
heightened degree of Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  Although 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg ultimately conclude that 
reasonable articulable suspicion would be the most appropriate 
standard,227 their analysis does not account for the fact, 
elaborated upon at length above, that reasonable articulable 
suspicion requirements have a minimal effect, if any at all, on 
police conduct.228  Because a reasonable articulable suspicion 
regime would not accomplish the deterrent objectives of the 
exclusionary rule, Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion that canine 
sniffs should be controlled by Terry appears to run afoul of the 
Supreme Court’s avowed objective “to compel respect for the 
[Fourth Amendment] in the only effectively available way—by 
removing the incentive to disregard it.”229  
A probable cause regime would accomplish this objective 
most effectively.  While the notion that a reasonable articulable 
suspicion regime fails to deter unconstitutional police conduct 
would be sufficient, in and of itself, to justify a requirement of 
probable cause under the deterrence rule articulated in Mapp, 
such a conclusion is equally supported by the Court’s holding in 
Kyllo v. United States.  Insofar as the Kyllo ruling proscribes 
the warrantless application of technologies not in general 
public use,230 the Court’s holding appears to endorse the notion 
that drug sniffing canines should be subjected to a probable 
cause regime.  Like thermal imaging devices, drug sniffing 
canines are not readily available to individual consumers.231  
Since drug sniffing canines are not in general public use, their 
use implicates legitimate privacy interests that should be 
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subject to the strong protection of the Court’s exclusionary 
rule.232  Indeed, as noted above, canine sniffs may implicate 
even stronger privacy interests than thermal imaging 
devices.233  Whereas thermal imaging devices enable police to 
detect only a “crude visual, or . . . image” of heat radiating from 
a house,234 canine alerts permit intimate inspection of an 
individual’s “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”235
Although Kyllo’s “general public use” test arguably 
provides the strongest existing judicial justification for 
subjecting canine sniffs to a probable cause regime, it is 
nevertheless an undesirable rationale for imposing a probable 
cause requirement.  As noted above, the Kyllo rule imposes a 
Fourth Amendment stigma upon emerging technologies, 
requiring that they be subject to probable cause requirements 
until they come into general public use.  If this rule is allowed a 
broad application, law enforcement agencies will have no 
incentive to forgo the demonstrably inaccurate and invasive 
canine sniff test in favor of more reliable and less intrusive 
technologies.  As such, the court’s ruling in Kyllo has a chilling 
effect on the development of technologies such as the nascent 
“Dog-on-a-Chip”—a handheld sensing device designed to mimic 
(and even improve upon) the capabilities of a drug sniffing 
canine.236  Under the Kyllo rule, this technology would be 
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though its 
compactness and accuracy assures that it is less invasive than 
the canine sniff test.237  Moreover, since the device promises to 
greatly reduce law enforcement agencies’ expenditures in the 
course of providing food and general care for their canine 
detection units, applying the Kyllo rule would detract from the 
significant savings that this device promises for law 
enforcement agencies.238  Therefore, the Kyllo rule would result 
in a net loss in the realm of public safety by requiring that 
resources that would otherwise be freed for other law 
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enforcement activities continue to be expended in the service of 
an antiquated canine program. 
It follows from this analysis that a probable cause 
regime is most likely to encourage law enforcement agencies to 
divert resources from canine detection programs to 
technologies that are more accurate and less invasive.  In order 
for such a regime to be effective, a court subjecting the canine 
sniff test to a probable cause requirement would need to 
carefully distinguish Kyllo on the ground that Kyllo involved a 
bright line protection of the home—an environment in which 
the court concluded that all details are “intimate.”239  Such a 
ruling would have the twin virtues of remedying the negative 
consequences of the Caballes Court’s holding that canine sniffs 
are not searches for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
and freeing police officers to pursue new search technologies for 
purposes other than home surveillance. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Note has shown that the Caballes Court’s 
classification of the canine sniff as a non-search provides 
incentives for law enforcement agencies to maintain their use 
of canines as an investigatory device.  This consequence is 
undesirable from a policy perspective in light of pervasive 
evidence indicating that canines, contrary to the prevailing 
legal wisdom, are not one hundred percent accurate.  Because 
canines err, false alerts enable police officers to conduct full-
blown searches of people and objects that implicate legitimate 
privacy interests.  This empirical fact lends support to the 
argument that canine sniffs should be subject to some level of 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  Reasonable articulable suspicion 
will not suffice, however, to accomplish the deterrent objective 
of the exclusionary rule.  Because courts determine whether or 
not a search was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion 
with undue deference to the subjective impressions of police 
officers, incentive remains for law enforcement agencies to 
maintain their investments in the inaccurate and invasive drug 
sniffing canine.   
By requiring that police officers conduct investigations 
and uncover facts sufficient to merit the issuance of a judicial 
warrant, a requirement of probable cause will provide the 
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greatest incentive for law enforcement agencies to seek more 
accurate and less invasive technologies.  Law enforcement 
demand will, in turn, foster development of such technologies 
in the market, provided that courts considering such 
technologies are careful to distinguish the use of these 
technologies in the field from the facts at issue in Kyllo v. 
United States.  Because Kyllo’s holding can be limited to the 
use of emerging technologies for the purpose of home 
surveillance, requiring police officers to have probable cause 
prior to the use of a drug sniffing canine will enable law 
enforcement agencies to better provide for public safety without 
running afoul of the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
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